When the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, meets this Friday for the first time with the new president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, there will be an unavoidable topic on his agenda: the crisis in the Middle East and the possibility of a war between Iran and Israel.
The current confrontation between Israel and Iran’s allies, which began with the surprise and bloody attack launched by the Palestinian group Hamas on October 7, 2023, is already fully affecting Lebanon – where Israel fights the Shiite militia Hezbollah – and threatens to reach to Iran, after that country fired hundreds of missiles at Israel on October 1.
The possibility of an open war between Iran and Israel causes concern in the international community, both because of the human and material damage that it could generate and because of its possible effects on the world economy, as there are fears that Israel will attack Iran’s oil facilities or that Tehran interrupts the flow of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, through which more than 20% of the oil consumed on the planet circulates daily.
But the meeting between Putin and Pezeshkian in Turkmenistan, on the sidelines of a summit of Central Asian nations, is especially important for Iran, a state that has very little support in the community of nations.
“Iran has very few options because, if we leave aside its non-state partners like Hamas or the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, it cooperates with a small number of states, but in all cases that cooperation is limited,” says Thomas Juneau, professor at the Graduate School of Political Affairs. Public and International Studies from the University of Ottawa, to BBC Mundo.
Mansour Farhang, professor emeritus of political science at Bennington College (Vermont, USA), assures that Iran is one of the “most isolated countries in the world.”
“Iran does not have any partner or party state that identifies with its ideological position or its expansionist policy in the region.“Farhang tells BBC Mundo.
This isolation of Iran is not new – although it has been exacerbated by the policies adopted since the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 1979 – and constitutes a phenomenon that international relations experts have called “strategic loneliness.”
Alone in the world
In an academic article published in 2014, Juneau explained this “strategic loneliness.”
“Iran is alone in the world. “Its acute strategic loneliness is primarily the result of structural factors inherent to its place in the regional and international systems and is largely independent of the actions of whoever governs the country,” he wrote.
“Its international posture does not make cooperation with other states impossible, nor does it predetermine a condition of permanent conflict with its neighbors. Strategic loneliness, however, explains why Iran has very limited common interests with its neighbors and why cooperation is difficult and expensive to achieve,” he added.
Several factors contribute to Iran’s isolation, including the fact that it is the only ethnically Persian state in the world.
Additionally, although it is estimated that there are fifty countries with a majority Muslim population, only in a handful of them the bulk of the population is Shiite, the branch of Islam in which Iran belongs.
This country is also affected by its geographical location, since is located in a neighborhood with strong states with great ambitions which have led to major wars and rivalries in the past.
Thus, on its northern (maritime) border is Russia; in the northwest is Türkiye, cradle of the former Ottoman Empire and one of the historical rivals of the Persians; In the west, there is Iraq, with which it shares a long border and with which it was at war for almost a decade in the 1980s; To the south is Saudi Arabia, a country with a Sunni majority that is home to the two most sacred cities for Islam and which, together with Iran, is one of the two reference powers in the Gulf area.
In that region there are also several countries governed by Sunnis and that also have security agreements with the US: Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The latter is the headquarters of the US 5th Fleet, while Qatar hosts the headquarters of US forces in the area.
Other major countries with which Iran shares borders are India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
As if that were not enough, in his text Juneau highlighted that “the Islamic Republic is not a member of any major regional organization or security agreementunlike two of its main rivals: NATO member Türkiye; and Saudi Arabia, a member of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council.”
From the limits of geography to those of politics
Beyond the geopolitical conditions, historical rivalries and power ambitions of each State, the policies adopted by Iran since the triumph of the Islamic revolution have contributed to its international isolation.
“Since 1979, Iran has adopted a stance of rejection of the regional order dominated by the United States. Although Tehran made some efforts to change it violently in the early years of the revolution, it has since become a revisionist actor with limited rather than unlimited objectives,” Juneau explained.
In those early years, the Iranian revolution defined some of the main lines such as its frontal clash with Washington, as well as its rejection of the existence of the State of Israel.
Mansour Farhang affirms that this policy against Israel did not have an ideological basis, but rather was an opportunistic move.
“Ayatollah Khomeini’s main objective was to export his revolution. Strategically, he planned to exploit the anti-Israeli sentiment in Arab countries.. “He believed that attacking Israel, questioning its legitimacy and, in fact, referring to Israel as a cancer that must be eliminated from the geography of the region was going to help him gain support,” says Farhang, noting that the Islamic revolution had been very popular. in its beginnings among the population of Arab countries.
“Khomeini thought that confronting Israel was an indirect appeal to the general public of the Arab world, which would also threaten Arab governments,” he adds.
He explains that by that time, most of the Arab governments in the region had already come to the conclusion that the confrontation with Israel was not going to bring them anything of benefit.
Months before the Islamic revolution, Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel and became the first Arab country to recognize Israel. Jordan, which would take 15 years to do the same, had maintained informal cooperation with Israel on matters of mutual interest since the 1970s.
In those early years, Khomeini’s attempts to export his revolution to the countries of the region did not help him gain friendships.. One of the first clashes occurred with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where the existence of a Shia majority under a Sunni government seemed to provide an opportunity for Tehran that ended in a long and disastrous war.
“Hussein was legally responsible for invading Iran, but politically it was Khomeini who first sent money and intelligence agents to promote anti-Hussein activities in Iraq,” Farhang notes.
That war, started in 1980, could have ended in 1982, when Iran managed to expel Iraqi troops from its territory and an opportunity for peace presented itself, with a resolution passed unanimously in the UN Security Council calling for a cease fire.
“Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states offered Iran US$20 billion for the reconstruction of the damage caused by the war, if Iran accepted this UN resolution, but Khomeini rejected it and said that they wanted to go from Karbala to Al-Quds, that is, from Iraq to Jerusalem.. And the war continued for six more years,” says Farhang.
Tehran also broke relations with Egypt in 1980, after that country granted asylum to the overthrown shah. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. But the differences have gone further. Tehran rejects that Egypt has made peace with Israel, while in Cairo they have viewed with suspicion the links and affinities between the Iranian regime and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
More partners than allies
But if its relations with the states around it are not the best, Tehran has cultivated an entire network of non-state organizations that serve as allies and that make up what has been called the resistance axis.
It is an alliance led by Iran in which Syria also participates and which includes Hezbollah militias in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, as well as Shiite militias in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, among others.
These organizations are perceived not only by Israel, but also by the United States and the Arab countries of the Gulf as a threat.
Your actions can have a global impact as seen with the attacks launched by the Houthis over the last year against merchant ships crossing the Red Sea, forcing shipping companies to take longer and more expensive alternative routes.
These diversions have impacted the income that Egypt obtains from the transit of ships through the Suez Canal, which has fallen by around 50% in the last eight months, generating losses of up to $6 billion, according to the Egyptian president. , Abdel Fattah al Sisi.
Beyond non-state actors, Iran has relations with a multitude of nations – in fact, at least 162 countries have embassies in Tehran – but it has few real allies, most of which are very limited in terms of the support they give it. they can lend.
Let’s see what some of their most important supports are.
SYRIA
He is considered the only real ally that Iran has in the Middle East. However, Bashar al-Assad’s government has very limited capabilities to support Tehran.
“The Syrian government is extremely weakdoes not control all of the country’s territory and is very focused on itself due to the legacy of the civil war. Therefore, in terms of potential contribution, Syria is quite limited beyond serving as a geographical springboard from which Iran can project its influence in the Levant,” Juneau says.
IRAN AND LEBANON
Although analysts assure that Iran has great influence over what happens in these neighboring countries, this is not exercised through formal relations between governments. but through The Shiite parties and militias that live in those countries.
Hezbollah has enjoyed de facto authority that is autonomous from the Lebanese government. Although it has legislators in Parliament and has had ministers in the cabinet, it does not formally represent the government of that country.
“In Iraq, Shiite parties and militias have infiltrated the government and part of the security apparatus, but their loyalty in practice is to their movements rather than to the national government,” says Juneau.
“The Iraqi government, for its part, is trying to balance its relations with Iran and the United States,” he adds.
RUSSIA
Ties between Tehran and Moscow have strengthened in recent years, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Iran has become a supplier of weapons for the Russian offensiveespecially drones.
“Both have become very close in the military and security sphere,” says Juneau.
Moscow would have many ways to return the favor, including the sale of cutting-edge SU-35 fighter jets or the powerful S-400 missile defense system, which Iran has long coveted.
The issue is that decisions of this type could damage Russia’s ties with other relevant countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or, obviously, Israel, a country with which Putin has had cordial relations and that despite its alliance with the US has so far remained on the sidelines of the Ukrainian conflict.
CHINA
China has been the main buyer of Iranian oil for years and, despite international sanctions, was still so at the end of 2023, according to the Nikkei agency. It is also the largest customer of Iran’s non-oil exports.
But Beijing is a power with global interests that prevents foreign conflicts from affecting its interests.
“China is very careful to balance its relations and not to get so close to Iran that it damages its ties with Tehran’s rivals.. “China has not wanted to play a major role in Middle East politics and security because it wants to focus on the commercial side and wants to avoid being affected by these disputes,” says Juneau.
Mansour Farhang agrees: “China has very good trade relations with every country in the region. His foreign policy in the Middle East is similar to that of a businessman or a merchant,” he points out.
NORTH KOREA
North Korea and Iran have a history of exchanging arms for oil dating back to the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War.
Pyongyang sent weapons and missiles, while Tehran sent oil and fertilizers.
In fact, experts believe that the Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range missile is a version that Tehran developed from the North Korean No Dong 1 missile, which it acquired in the 1990s.
The link between both countries has been maintained until now, but it has its limitations due to the strong sanctions to which both countries are subject.
“Iran and North Korea have collaborated for years on issues such as sanctions evasion and weapons productionbut North Korea is a very poor state with a reduced role in the Middle East, so the benefits for Iran are limited,” warns Juneau.
VENEZUELA, CUBA, NICARAGUA AND BOLIVIA
In Latin America, Iran had a long-standing relationship with Cuba, forged within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, but closer ties have developed in recent years, mainly thanks to the establishment of a close alliance with Venezuela and its partners in the ALBA, which include Cuba itself, as well as Nicaragua and Bolivia.
These countries share with Tehran a strong rejection of the United States and tend to support each other in the diplomatic field, coordinating their positions within different international organizations.
Its practical usefulness for Iran, however, is limited.
“Your support is symbolic, but no more than that. Leaders from Iran and these countries love to meet and hold press conferences criticizing the US. and they say they are partners in opposing colonialism, imperialism, etc., but in practice, from a military and security perspective, can they help Iran in its current fight against Israel and the United States? “I think the answer is, to a large extent, no,” says Juneau.
Thus, in the current context, it seems that the most important and powerful support that Iran can receive It may come from Russia.
On this point, however, experts do not agree in their assessments.
Farhang believes that if the crisis with Israel escalates, Moscow – like Beijing – will choose to call for a ceasefire, trying not to get directly involved in the conflict.
Juneau, on the other hand, thinks Moscow could take a step forward. “Russia and Iran already maintain a very productive trade in weapons, technology and information exchange. They do it in Ukraine. “Should the tension between Iran and Israel continue, I have no doubt that it will continue and could very well intensify,” he points out.
Given this uncertainty, we will have to closely follow this Friday’s meeting between Putin and Pezeshkian in search of clues about how far Moscow would be willing to go.
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