Two reasons make next Sunday a special day for democracy in Argentina. One is historical. The other, the great unknown that opens on the same day about the future of the country.
When Raúl Alfonsín assumed the presidency on December 10, 1983, a military dictatorship ended in Argentina that since its beginning in 1976 killed, tortured and left 30,000 missing, according to human rights organizations.
From then on, other democratically elected governments followed, although some ended their mandate early in the midst of major economic and social crises: Alfonsín himself handed over power early in 1989 and Fernando de la Rúa resigned in 2001 in the face of strong protests in the streets.
“From 1983 until now we have had countless problems, but they have all been resolved through institutional means. That seems to me to be the main achievement of the 40 years of democracy,” says Victoria Murillo, an Argentine political scientist who directs the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia University.
This same Sunday, Javier Milei, a libertarian economist elected in a runoff last month with 56.6% of the votes and an anti-system discourse in the face of another colossal crisis, will assume the Argentine presidency.
Now it remains to be seen if Milei “is a character who can put Argentine democracy at risk,” says Murillo in a telephone interview with BBC Mundo.
On Sunday, December 10, Argentina will celebrate 40 years of democracy. And on the same day Javier Milei takes office as president. Do you see any symbolism in this coincidence of dates?
There is an aspect of continuity.
Let’s think that Argentina was democratized for men in 1912. From then until 1983 it was a period of great instability, between democratic and military governments. When there were clean elections, radicalism won until 1930 and then Peronism.
In 1983 the longest period of democracy in Argentine history began. And also the first with competitive democracy. There have been Peronist and non-Peronist governments, and democracy has survived these political changes for 40 years, even with an enormous crisis like that of 2001.
In that sense, although Milei’s election represents the rejection of traditional options, it once again channels discontent within the democratic system.
Milei may say “let them all go,” but that did not result in a military coup or political instability, but in a clean election where he was elected.
Beyond other aspects of your program, it seems to me that the election itself speaks of the solidity of Argentine democracy. Let’s hope it continues like this.
Does Milei represent a challenge to the consensus that existed in Argentina about the dictatorship?
Let’s see what happens, it doesn’t seem like a priority for him. But it is something that modifies a consensus that took a long time to reach.
It began with the Conadep (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons) report and the trial of the military junta, the end of an era of political violence and the idea that human rights are crucial.
That was not only in the political field. Much has been gained in other areas of rights.
Let’s think that when democracy arrived there was not even a divorce law: it is Alfonsín who passed it. Also that of parental authority. Argentina is the first country to establish gender quotas in Congress, to approve equal marriage. The gender law, equal adoption. The legalization of abortion…
This tradition of human rights emerges from the consensus against the dictatorship’s crimes against humanity.
In that sense, Milei is the first president to question it. Although Menem pardoned the commanders, the idea was pacification. But Milei, in one of the presidential debates, says that it was a war and there were excesses: a bit of the commanders’ argument.
That makes it very different and opens a question about what is to come.
At the same time, some warn that a large majority voted for Milei within the rules of democracy and it is difficult to attribute to all those voters a sympathy for authoritarianism, a rejection of human rights or even a coincidence with the doubts that he raised the figure of 30,000 missing…
Let us remember that in the Argentine electoral system there are two rounds. In the first round, who are his voters in any case, he got 30% of the votes.
My impression from what I have seen in the polls is that it is not an ideological vote. It is rather a vote of anger against the political system, of frustration especially over the economic issue and discontent with the two existing political options.
The second round is an election where he embodied the opposition to the governing party, in a context where governing parties throughout Latin America have not been re-elected since 2019, except in the case of the Colorado Party in Paraguay.
And with a very bad situation in Argentina, inflation of 150% and poverty of 40%, it is not surprising that the ruling party lost and people are looking for a replacement.
Would you say that this 40th anniversary is a turning point for Argentine democracy?
This 40th anniversary is in some sense a turning point.
In Argentina, economic development has not been particularly successful, but democracy has proven to be very capable of withstanding crises.
You have to see what capacity you have at this moment to face a new challenge. And see if Milei is a political restructuring – the emergence of a new coalition that will function within the democratic system – or if she is a character who can put Argentine democracy at risk.
For now he is a very weak, minority president. Faced with the policies he proposes, which can generate a lot of protest and discontent, he is looking for a legislative coalition conditional on certain laws, but not necessarily loyal if things go bad and there is an impeachment trial.
Many minority presidents in Latin America have not been able to finish their mandate when facing contexts of crisis, social protest, and a dramatic drop in popularity.
That is, we can see an institutional crisis that does not necessarily result in him becoming a Bukele and there being a concentration of power, but rather an absence of power.
It would have a gigantic social cost if he tried to concentrate power. First it would require him to do something that would give him enormous popularity. And with a civil society as mobilized and organized as Argentina’s, it seems difficult to achieve this.
But there is always a first time.
The program that Milei wants to promote includes cuts in subsidies, privatizations, reduction of the State…
That is what worries me the most: the social protest and the degree of violence that this can trigger.
Do you see a risk of political instability in the immediate future?
I see a risk of political instability and repression that could generate a social reaction as well.
And there are comments, which for now are nothing more than comments, for example from former president (Mauricio) Macri calling on pro-government groups to defend the government in the streets of protests, which do not seem particularly productive to me.
That is why there are many question marks that have more to do with social protest and how that issue is handled.
At the same time, Milei could argue that he has legitimacy to push his program: he won by 11 points. And Peronism, associated with the union movement, seems weakened after this election…
Yes, those points give him the idea that people voted for an adjustment. It’s not clear to me what adjustment people voted for.
Voters want inflation to go down. But he was not very clear during the campaign how the costs of this adjustment were going to be distributed, beyond the fact that he said he was going to end corruption in politics.
Political positions in the State are very few in proportional terms, it is not enough to eliminate them. Half of the public budget is pensions. If you want to make an adjustment you have to pay costs. I don’t know how he is going to distribute those costs and what reaction he will have.
On the other hand, Peronism has made the worst election in its history. That 37% is not only his lowest percentage, but he has never governed so few provinces. It is really in a crisis situation, perhaps more acute than that of 1983, although that year the defeat was surprising and in this case not so much.
In 1983 there was a process of leadership renewal. The question is whether the same thing is going to happen now in the face of these electoral results and a fairly bad performance in this last administration.
In these 40 years Mauricio Macri was the only non-Peronist president who completed his term. Without having the crystal ball, would you bet that Milei will make it too?
The situation is very uncertain. And he is a much more minority president than any we have ever had. It is very difficult to know how his administration will develop.
There is definitely a risk that he will not finish his term. If the social protest is very large and the circumstantial allies that he is trying to build abandon him, it is not so difficult to think that he will not reach the end of his mandate.
We have to see what happens; there is an institutional process if that happens. And let’s hope that it comes to the end of his term because none of these crisis processes are good for Argentine democracy.
But he could not guarantee that he will reach the end of his term.
What has been the greatest achievement of Argentine democracy in these four decades?
He has had several achievements. Teaching us to live in peace after many years in which it was very difficult, especially from 1955 to 1983, with many military coups and political violence.
From 1983 until now we have had countless problems, but they have all been resolved through institutional means. That seems to me to be the main achievement of the 40 years of democracy. Not the entire region has had it.
There have been very important setbacks in many countries with respect to democracy.
In fact, Latinobarómetro’s regional survey this year shows Argentina, after Uruguay, as the second Latin American country where the idea that democracy is preferable to any other form of government is most shared by the population (69%), quite a bit above the regional average (48%). It is a fact that supports what you pointed out…
I think so. I’m not saying people are happy with how democracy works. In fact, there is a gap with satisfaction. But there is a consensus that this is the way we should solve our problems.
Considering the Argentine history of the 20th century, it seems to me an extraordinary achievement.
In turn, the same survey shows that between 2020 and 2023 the number of Argentines who believe that an authoritarian government may be preferable in certain circumstances increased five percentage points: it went from 13% to 18%. Should this be of concern?
Compared to the rest of the region, that number is low.
It always worries me and I would prefer it to be zero. But, considering the challenges that Argentina has, the economic and social situation is With the increase in insecurity that is a problem throughout the region, it seems to me that we are still on the good side.
We must try to build so that democracy begins to solve the problems it has not solved. In 1983, Alfonsín campaigned saying that democracy was peace and that with democracy “you eat, you heal and you educate.”
Democracy brought peace, political violence ended, but “you eat, you cure and you educate” are pending issues in many aspects.
Alfonsín also said that that day when he took office, “public immorality” ended and “a decent government” began. Now, 40 years later, Milei has just won the elections with the promise of putting an end to “the caste” and the “hot politicians” or thieves. Is the fight against corruption another pending task of Argentine democracy?
The fight against corruption is a pending task for all Latin American democracies.
It is key, because people increasingly believe that legitimacy in democracy is linked to performance. And performance is increasingly dependent on variants over which Latin America does not necessarily have control, such as raw material cycles.
Furthermore, the fact that there have been so many corruption scandals makes people think that the rulers are not only rather incompetent in many countries, but that they are insensitive and don’t care about anything. In the midst of the pandemic there were many corruption scandals regarding access to health.
People say: “Not only are things bad, but on top of that it’s like they’re laughing at me and getting rich.”
Milei’s victory has excited the far right in the West and generated congratulations from former presidents such as the American Donald Trump and the Brazilian Jair Bolsonaro. How much does Milei have in common with them?
Each of these phenomena are peculiar.
On the one hand, in the world they look at everything from their own lens. For example, in the United States there is a lot of interest in Milei because they see him as Trump. In Brazil there was fear because Lula’s government sees him as Bolsonaro.
Milei has been linked to this movement. He invited Bolsonaro to his presidential inauguration.
But we still don’t know who Milei really is.
Part of what led him to victory is that everyone saw in him what they wanted to see. And he has ideas that bring him closer to those characters, each one different. For example, Milei is with free trade and Donald Trump with protectionism. It’s not that they are all on the same policy. But Milei does have ideas that make him part of that group.
Now, that is not enough to govern. Even among his voters, the majority did not vote for those ideas but because he seemed authentic.
Not appearing political is something that many of these characters, like Trump, have exploited. But Trump arrived with the Republican Party and Bolsonaro with a coalition of support in a political system that is traditionally one of minority presidents.
The novelty of Milei is that he arrives with eight senators and 38 deputies in a country that is not used to coalition governments. It would be necessary to see what she is going to do and how she is going to build from the presidency, because she does not arrive with a structure as armed as the others.
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