Thursday, December 26

“With” or “Without” #ElectricReform, #La4TVa

By: Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera Updated 18 Apr 2022, 3: 18 am EDT

#LaReformaEléctricaNoFue

Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) once again confirms that he turned out to be a political genius. The current Mexican president surprises us once again with his ingenious devices in the political-electoral strategy that has been operating for several years.

After the setback suffered by the reform of the Law of the Electricity Industry (LIE) of March of last year, AMLO ventures into a company that would make him win in any way and under any circumstance. At the end of last year, the Executive sent to the Congress of the Union a proposal for constitutional reform in electrical matters that, in addition, would reserve lithium and other “strategic” minerals (which it did not clearly define) for the Mexican State. This last proposal would apparently generate support from its “distant neighbor”, the United States, since it would eliminate China from the equation.

From that moment on, an intense political debate began in Mexico and heated discussions took place in the Congress of the Union, while a great information campaign was generated accompanied by an overwhelming social mobilization at the national level—through which the National Regeneration Party-Movement (Morena to simplify the idea) formed and spread its cadres throughout the Republic in an extraordinary way, as we were able to verify. Debates across the media and “Open Parliament” forums further consolidated AMLO’s support base and broadened his reach across the country. The issues of energy sovereignty, the human right to electricity and the leadership by the State over the nation’s strategic natural resources resonated with a large part of the population, thanks to an extraordinary communication strategy.

The mobilization and attention generated by the theme and the motto of the #ReformaEléctricaVa in very wide circles of Mexican public opinion surprised locals and strangers. The clumsiness of the opposition was also surprising in repeating a stale speech that did not convince anyone, only those who were already convinced and clinging to their small preserves of power and their positions in Mexican politics—who, moreover, will most likely lose in the very short term. The latter, considering the balance of forces that can be seen with the naked eye and that can be seen in the streets (social mobilization) and in opinion polls. The popularity of the President of the Republic is firm; after this process of discussion and voting on the electricity reform, very probably this firmness will be even more forceful than before.

I finish writing this text a few minutes after knowing the result of the vote on the electricity sector reform bill presented by the Mexican president to the Union Congress. Finally, the qualified majority is not reached and, therefore, the reform is not approved. But “with” or “without” reform, Andrés Manuel López Obrador would score a clear victory anyway. In the process that is currently unfolding, I can outline some lessons learned that are worth listing. In this process, which I followed very closely, I learned the following:

  1. That the Energy Reform of 2013 in all its areas—and especially in electrical matters—represented a great robbery against the nation.
  2. That those who were in charge of elaborating—and those who approved said reform, secondary laws and contract structure—legislated in favor of the interests of transnational companies in the energy sector and to the detriment of our country and our natural resources. The foregoing turns them into “homeland sellers”.
  3. That it is necessary for the Mexican State to maintain the stewardship over its strategic natural resources, as this is a National Security issue, especially in these times of great volatility in the electricity markets and energy markets in general.
  4. That the right to electricity is a human right.
  5. That large foreign capital (supported by some large Mexican businessmen) and the United States government are willing “to do anything” to maintain their privileges in the first case and to defend the so-called “Monroe Doctrine” (” America for Americans”) in the case of the US government.
  6. That the energy lobby is very powerful and that uses a sophisticated lobbying system that includes the big media, prestigious think tanksby any means necessary) to please their bosses and protect their interests, even at the cost of rights and the impoverishment of their fellow citizens.
  7. That even with its many cognitive limitations and insufficiencies in what is When it comes to argumentative capacity, lobbyists have abundant resources that will ensure companies obtain the highest possible profits.
  8. That there are legislators who do not respond to the “People” who voted for them, but rather to other types of incentives or to the desperation of losing a “bone”.

  9. That “with” or “without” reform, AMLO and his 4T were going to win. AMLO won (losing) in the end.
  10. That “with” or “without” reform, the United States was going to win too (because of lithium). The United States ended up winning in the end, as expected.
  11. That the Congress of the Union debated two country models: 1) one that supports social justice, the human right to electricity and the sovereignty of the Mexican State and 2) the other that supports the interests of big capital and transnational oligopolies.
  12. That the approval of the constitutional reform in electrical matters would have been preferable without a doubt, but that AMLO does not lose completely with the result adverse end of the vote. The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice on April 7 on the “non-constitutionality of the LIE”, gives the Mexican State a wide margin of maneuver to recover the stewardship of the national electricity system—although the road will be long and perhaps somewhat tortuous (but not impassable).
  13. That AMLO wins by losing and that the victory by the opposition is pyrrhic (in the end they end up losing).
  14. That the citizens and MORENA are going to charge dearly for the betrayal to the sellouts of the Opposition, which will be reflected in the results of the midterm elections and in the 2024. Terrible results for the opposition are predicted in these processes. The PRI is advancing towards irrelevance and perhaps that party and the PRD are heading in a direct line towards their disappearance.
  15. That although #LaReformaEléctricaNoFue, #La4TSíVa.

On the issue of lithium

The most complex part of the energy counter-reform proposal, and perhaps the most important, is that related to lithium. Here I include some notes after having talked with experts on the subject.

These are the key considerations that we were able to raise before the reform was voted

a- The strategic nature of lithium lies in the role it plays in energy storage. It is key in the transition to less harmful energies for the environment to the extent that it allows some problems of said energies to be resolved, such as intermittence.

b- However, for countries that have it in abundance, its strategic character also lies in what they can get from it. I refer in particular to income and the possibility of developing a litiferous industry that launches a growth model based on knowledge and innovation.

    c- The initiative sent by the President to the Congress of the Union (and which was not approved in the end in the Chamber of Deputies) contemplated the latter, because it did not lithium was only reserved for the State, but the link with the universities, technological development and the industrialization of the mineral were considered. Thus, President Andrés Manuel proposed this whole scheme as a “development strategy”.

    d- Such a task requires extremely abundant resources and a public policy that can only put up the Mexican State. The foregoing is proposed to guarantee that the collective interest is prioritized, and thus avoid making the same mistakes as in the case of the oil industry.

    e- Changes made as a concession to the Opposition (and which were also not approved), on the other hand, they did not guarantee (as I understand it) that this could happen since they left lithium as a resource reserved for the State, but it would be handed over to private interest through a scheme similar to that imposed for oil in 2013.

    f- The Deputies should then prioritize the collective interest and the general well-being of Mexicans. Under these conditions, they should have approved the President’s proposal regarding electrical energy and rejected the modifications proposed by the Opposition “for sale-homelands” in the matter of lithium (if I understood correctly).

    If the latter was not possible, then the entire reform should be rejected and wait for the President’s Plan B to operate, which consists of a reform to the Mining Law (also urgent), which would allow lithium to be fully exploited by the Nation. In short, Morena’s legislators did not have to reject it in public and they did not have to pay any political cost. It seems then that, ironically, the victory was actually for Morena’s legislators and the Party in general.

    The reform is not approved, the #ReformaEléctricaNoVa, but the # FourthTransformationIt goes, and it seems that it “goes” stronger and more determined than ever.

  1. Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera. Professor-researcher of Politics and Government, specialist in security issues, border studies and Mexico-United States relations. Author of Los Zetas Inc.