Relations between Venezuela and Guyana are at their lowest point in decades.
The old controversy over the Essequibo territory, which Venezuela claims was unceremoniously taken from it in an arbitration award that occurred in 1899 and which currently represents two-thirds of Guyana’s territory, has caused a deep crisis between both countries.
In 1966, both parties committed themselves through the so-called Geneva Agreement to seek a practical and satisfactory solution to the dispute.
But given that the good offices mechanism to which they had resorted for more than a quarter of a century had not led to a solution, Georgetown asked to take the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where it will be decided.
At the same time, Guyana has begun granting oil exploitation concessions in undelimited waters over which Venezuela considers it has rights.
In this context, the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro held a referendum last Sunday on Essequibo and is now promoting a law that would allow the annexation of that territory to Venezuela.
This is an announcement that has caused concern in Guyana, whose president, Irfaan Ali, has said that his defense forces are on full alert and in communication with the United States Southern Command.
Maduro has also accused the American company ExxonMobil, the main oil producer in Guyana, of financing Venezuelan opposition politicians.
In fact, Venezuela’s Attorney General, Tarek William Saab, ordered the arrest of 14 people – including several opposition politicians – on charges of treason for an alleged “financing and conspiracy plot related to ExxonMobil against Venezuela.”
The American company has said that the accusation is ridiculous and unfounded, while different analysts maintain that these actions by Maduro in relation to Essequibo respond to an attempt to weaken the Venezuelan opposition in the run-up to 2024, when the of presidential elections.
In this context, BBC Mundo spoke with Sadio Garavini di Turno, who was Venezuelan ambassador to Georgetown (1980 – 1984) and for decades has dedicated himself to the study of the Essequibo dispute.not only as a diplomat but also from academia.
Garavini is a doctor in Political Science and a university professor. He has numerous publications on the foreign policy of Venezuela and Guyana.
The government of Nicolás Maduro announced that it will create a Venezuelan state in Essequibo and that it will grant oil concessions in that territory controlled by Guyana. How is this understood?
That’s ridiculous internationally because, obviously, what does that mean?
Maduro appointed a general in charge of the defense of Guayana Esequiba, but based in Tumeremo, which is a Venezuelan town in the south of the Bolívar state; He decided that PDVSA will have a section to make investments in Guayana Esequiba.
Well, the question is how are you going to do it? That would obviously imply an action of force. As for PDVSA, the company does not even have money to invest in “current Venezuela” and would like to see if it has money to do so in the marine and underwater areas off Essequibo.
Why does Venezuela assume this attitude now?
All of this is an internal political maneuver regarding an issue of an international nature, to try to show that something is being done regarding the Essequibo claim, after the referendum which was another internal political maneuver to try to make people forget the success of the opposition primaries.
In international terms, the only way to exercise sovereignty over Guyana is to do so in the way they are saying, that they are going to make a new map of Venezuela that includes Essequibo, when before it was an area under claim. Well, it should be a military action to exercise sovereignty over the territory.
Is such military action possible?
I believe that the Venezuelan Armed Forces are not capable of doing so due to the disaster they are in. Furthermore, there is no road, so they would have to go through the jungle, make a landing or send paratroopers, that implies total incapacity.
The truth is, from an international point of view, what they are doing is irresponsible because it does us great harm in the International Court of Justice, where the issue is in process.
What the government should do is prepare to defend Venezuela’s rights in the International Court of Justice.
What is the importance of Essequibo for Venezuela?
For Venezuela, it is essential to defend the exit to the Atlantic, the projection of its exclusive economic zone and its continental shelf, not only the one produced by the Essequibo in claim, but also that of Delta Amacuro [estado venezolano ubicado en el extremo nororiental del país, frente al Océano Atlántico y junto al Esequibo].
Guyana, in an arbitrary manner, has marked a line that supposedly marks the delimitation with Venezuela and that is not acceptable because it cuts off our projection into the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Delta Amacuro state. And that is unacceptable.
In terms of Essequibo itself, it must be remembered that it represents two thirds of the territory that Guyana considers its own, administers and over which it has had control since the arbitration award of 1899.
The Geneva agreement speaks of a practical and satisfactory solution for both.
If we were to reach an agreement on that basis, it is obvious that an agreement satisfactory to Guyana would never contemplate the surrender of two thirds of its territory. This must be understood if the Geneva Agreement is read carefully.
What can be achieved through the Geneva Agreement is a sensible territorial compensation which, by the way, is very difficult to agree between the two parties, so a third party has to intervene, most likely.
That is why I put the emphasis on the marine and underwater areas in an area rich in oil and not so much on the territory itself because following the Geneva Agreement, obviously, only part of it could return to Venezuela.
How does this maritime delimitation that Guyana has made affect Venezuela?
This cuts off hundreds of thousands of km2 of marine and underwater areas rich in oil, gas, fishing and, furthermore, the exit to the Atlantic. If that line is accepted we would have to ask for permission to go out into the Atlantic, which is obviously unacceptable.
But that has to do laterally with the issue of Essequibo. It has to do with why Guyana has drawn that line in an arbitrary way starting from Punta Barima, which is the tip of the Essequibo territory. But that will have to be debated in the end.
It is irresponsible on the part of the Maduro government that we are ignoring the International Court of Justice. Now the government is saying that the ICJ is in the pay of Exxon.
There, at the International Court of Justice, is where we will have to go to resolve the problem of the delimitation of marine and underwater areas after the Essequibo issue is resolved.
What mechanism or strategy should Venezuela use to assert the rights it claims to have over the Essequibo?
Now there is no alternative. People do not understand that two secretaries general of the United Nations and the last good officiant decided to take the issue to the International Court of Justice.
If there is no agreement between the parties, the Geneva Agreement gives the Secretary General the power to decide which mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes to apply, so there is nothing left to grasp from a public international law point of view.
We have to defend ourselves in the International Court of Justice and the government is not doing the task of preparing our countermemorial, to defend our rights.
We have the arguments to show that the 1899 arbitration award was unfair, the product of a political agreement between the Russian president of the tribunal and the two British members of the tribunal. That is what we should do with the greatest national and international experts.
The international community appears to support the current status quo. Guyana says it has the support of the OAS, Caricom, the Commonwealth, the United States and the United Kingdom, among others. Why aren’t more voices heard supporting Venezuela?
Guyana always had the support of Caricom and the Commonwealth. Caricom’s headquarters are in Georgetown and Guyana is a member of the Commonwealth.
But the rest, the vast majority of the international community, does not support Guyana, it supports that the problem be resolved peacefully in the International Court of Justice, as two UN Secretaries General have decided in accordance with the Geneva Agreement.
The Maduro government’s disinformation campaign makes it believe that the Geneva Agreement is one thing and the International Court of Justice is another. But it is in the International Court of Justice because of the Geneva agreement.
It is said that the strategy of avoiding the ICJ and trying to resolve the dispute with Guyana bilaterally was the one that best suited Venezuela. If so, isn’t it logical that Maduro tried to avoid going to the ICJ?
Sure, but it should have been done much sooner.
The very serious mistake of the Venezuelan government occurred in December 2013, when the then Foreign Minister of Guyana, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, said that after 26 years with bilateral negotiations assisted by the good officiant and many more years since the Geneva Agreement, it had arrived the time to finish delimiting the territory, both marine and underwater areas, and defining the controversy once and for all.
Because? Because between 2010 and 2013 in Guyana there were great discoveries of wealth, great concessions were made, there was the crisis of the Teknik Perdana, the famous seismic oil exploration ship that was detained by the Venezuelan Navy, and then Guyana said “this is it.” I’m coming” and they went to speak with the Secretary General of the UN to ask him to go to the ICJ.
Venezuela’s very serious mistake then was to stubbornly insist to the Secretary General that we wanted to continue with the bilateral negotiation assisted by a good officiant.
Given that this mechanism had not worked, if you put yourself in the shoes of the Secretary General you understand why he agreed with Guyana and not with Venezuela.
What Venezuela should have said is to propose going to mediation, conciliation, arbitration, that is, resorting to the other means of peaceful settlement of disputes provided for in the UN Charter that do not contemplate the ICJ, which is the most convenient for Guyana.
When there is mediation, a practical and fair solution is sought.
In the ICJ it is a strictly legal issue. It defines whether the 1899 arbitration award is valid or not. And that is very expensive and complicated to prove.
It is a topic that was what we always wanted to have avoided. When there is a res judicata, judges tend to favor the fact that the topic was closed.
We have the argument that the Geneva Agreement was signed and that therefore a practical solution must be sought, but that is what we should have promoted.
The milestones of almost two centuries of dispute
- In 1777, the Spanish Empire founded the Captaincy General of Venezuela, a territorial sub-entity that included Essequibo.
- In 1811, Venezuela became independent from Spain, and Essequibo was part of the nascent republic.
- In 1814, the United Kingdom acquired British Guiana – around 51,700 square kilometers – through a treaty with the Netherlands that did not define its western border.
- In 1840, London appointed explorer Robert Schomburgk to define the border. Shortly after, the “Schomburgk Line” was unveiled, a route that claimed nearly 80,000 additional square kilometers.
- In 1841, the dispute officially began when Venezuela denounced an incursion by the British Empire into its territory.
- In 1886, a new version of the Schomburgk Line is published that claims even more territory.
- In 1895, the United States denounced that the border of British Guyana had been expanded in a “mysterious manner” and recommended that the dispute be resolved in international arbitration.
- In 1899, the Paris Arbitration Award was issued, a ruling favorable to the United Kingdom with which the territory was officially under British rule.
- In 1949, a memorandum by American lawyer Severo Mallet-Prevost – part of Venezuela’s defense in the Paris Arbitration Award – was made public, in which he denounced that the award was a political compromise and that the judges were not impartial. These revelations and other documents serve for Venezuela to declare the award “null and void.”
- In 1966, three months before granting independence to Guyana, the United Kingdom agreed with Venezuela on the Geneva Agreement that recognized Venezuela’s claim and sought to find satisfactory solutions to resolve the dispute.
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