Repentance for historical mistakes is a national pastime in Germany. But, by German standards, the current soul-searching of Berlin’s policy towards Russia is extraordinary.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, many German politicians they have publicly acknowledged that they were wrong about Vladimir Putin. Even President Frank-Walter Steinmeier apologized, saying that it was a mistake to try to build bridges with Moscow based on trade and energy purchases.
“It is bitter to admit that during 30 For years we emphasized dialogue and cooperation with Russia,” said Nils Schmid, foreign affairs spokesman for Steinmeier’s party, the center-left Social Democrats (SPD). . “Now we have to admit that it didn’t work. That is why we have entered a new era of European security”.
This new era was calledzeitenwende -literally, turning point- by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, also of the SPD, in the now famous speech in front of the German Parliament a few days after the invasion.
What that means is new arms export rules, a huge increase in the defense spending and an end to Russian energy imports. A Russian gas pipeline to Germany called Nord Stream 2 has already been suspended.
“In the near future, cooperation with Russia will not happen. It will be more about containment and deterrence and, if necessary, defense against Russia”, Schmid tells me.
they have not worked… we have entered a new era of European security.”, Source: Nils Schmid, Source description: Foreign affairs spokesperson for the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Image: Nils Schmid, the foreign affairs spokesperson for Germany’s SPD party ” src=”https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/amp/idt2/460/90f4e1be-59e4-4c2d-b7f1-1945df7ed17b”>
These are unexpectedly aggressive words for a party that until just seven weeks ago believed that historical blame and Germany’s moral duty to make amends for the Nazis’ crimes meant peace with Russia at any cost.
However, in Berlin, the Ukraine war is felt very closely. Images of bombed Ukrainian buildings resemble German cities from World War II. And the third of a million refugees, most of them women and children, arriving at German train stations remind many of their parents or grandparents as children fleeing from Russian soldiers in 1945.
Even the German perception of its own history is changing.
Before the invasion, the general opinion was that the reunification of Germany had been achieved thanks to the dialogue with Moscow of another SPD chancellor, Willy Brandt. But now the debate has changed, remembering that Brandt’s diplomacy was backed by a strong dissuasive policy, including a defense budget for the then West Germany of 3% of GDP.
The issue Germany’s historical guilt over the war has also become more subtle. Before the invasion, the government argued against sending weapons to Ukraine based on the crimes committed by the Nazis against Russia.
“Under Putin, official Russian policy tried to monopolize memory of the Second World War for the sake of the bilateral relationship Germany-Russia”, explains Schmid. That covered the eyes of parts of German society to the suffering of the Ukrainians in that war, he adds.
Now there is much more awareness of the traumas suffered by the Ukrainians under Nazism.
The rhetoric of Berlin has changed dramatically. But some question whether actions are being taken quickly enough. Certainly, warm words of support are not enough for Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky. He has criticized Germany’s continued dependence on Russian oil and gas.
In an interview with the BBC last week, Zelensky called Russian energy purchases “making blood money.” And a planned visit to kyiv by President Steinmeier was canceled at the last minute.
- “Some European countries are making money from blood”: the president of Ukraine speaks to the BBC
There are conflicting versions of what happened: some Ukrainian officials say Steinmeier’s invitation was not withdrawn. But, without a doubt, German politicians and commentators interpret the cancellation of the visit as a sign of Ukraine’s mistrust of the German president, who as foreign minister during Angela Merkel’s government tried for years to achieve peace through the relations with Russia.
At the Brandenburg Gate -symbolic of another wende, the word the Germans use for the German reunification process – I met Claudia Major, specialist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP.
“Our partners see us and say: Very well, you announce a zeitenwende, but what are doing in practice?” she notes. “In terms of sanctions we are timid and in terms of sending weapons, we are reticent. So you are rightly wondering what this zeitenwende is all about, and bearing in mind that Germany is an economic, military and politics in the center of Europe, what we do matters, for better and for worse”.
Germany has promised to sanction imports of Russian energy, but wants to phase them out gradually, rather than of an instant embargo. The government maintains that the latter optionwould lead Germany into a recession and cost hundreds of thousands of jobs.
“That is a dilemma that Germany itself has created”, says political scientist Liana Fix, director of the Körber Foundation. “That is something that is obviously difficult for other countries to accept, which are willing to go ahead with an embargo and have prepared themselves with energy diversification.”
Ironically, it is a Green Party politician, Economy Minister Robert Habeck, whose party has for years urged energy independence from Russia, who is charged with solving this dilemma. .
On military support for Ukraine, Berlin says it is prepared to send whatever weapons kyiv needs. But there are complaints that some ministries are becoming entangled in bureaucracy. Here, too, it is a Greens politician, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, who is pushing the coalition government to move faster. She has requested the shipment of heavy weapons, such as tanks or fighter planes, to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the chancellor seems to be dodging the questions being asked – possibly worried about losing his party’s support.
Olaf Scholz has to keep the party on his side , govern within a tripartite coalition and overturn the pacifist and remorseful identity of Germany from one day to the next.
But even its allies say that the chancellor should at least communicate better than he is doing. A speech in Parliament and an appearance on a couple of TV talk shows are not enough, says Claudia Major.
Meanwhile, it seems that many German individuals are experiencing their own zeitenwende. Ariane Bemmer, a columnist for the daily Tagesspiegel , has written about re-evaluating her own feelings towards Russia. “I was definitely wrong, it’s like losing a friendship,” he tells me.
Like many in the old West Germany in the 1980, had mistrust of capitalism wild American style. She bought a book called “Ami Go Home” (Go away, gringos) -she never read it, but she thought it would look good on her shelf- and she was intrigued by the reforms in Russia.
“ In the United States they had Ronald Reagan as president, which was a shock to us. We thought: what is he going to do, this crazy actor with his cowboy boots? Will it set the world on fire? Russia was the place where all the good changes were happening, perestroika, freedom, winds of change ,” she explains.
Few in Germany still think like this. In a recent survey, 55% of Germans answered that Berlin should send Ukraine heavy weapons, such as tanks and fighter planes, to use against Russia.
For Ariane, and many other Germans, any residue of Russophile romanticism disappeared forever the day the tanks of Putin charged across the border into Ukraine.
Now you can receive notifications from BBC World. Download the new version of our app and activate it so you don’t miss our best content.
1239271047