The political situation in Venezuela seems to be waking up from a long slumber.
The appointment this Tuesday of a new National Electoral Council (CNE) made up in a more balanced way by representatives of the ruling party and by two personalities from a part of the opposition could serve as a starting point for the realization, for the first time since 2015, of elections that are recognized by the international community and in which the different political forces that make life in the South American country participate.
Although at the moment it is a rather small gap since the appointment has the rejection of Juan Guaidó , opposition leader recognized as interim president by much of the international community.
Although it is only a first step in a long way, this Tuesday’s appointments are in addition to other events that occurred during the last weeks it seemed in pointing to a reactivation of the political agenda after a 2020 in which, although there were controversial parliamentary elections, the political situation remained immobile .
BBC Mundo tells you five facts that point to possible changes in the political landscape of Venezuela.
1. A new electoral body
The CNE has been a fundamental piece in the political crisis in Venezuela since at least 2016, when the process to hold a referendum was aborted recall against Nicolás Maduro , after complaints of an alleged fraud in the collection of signatures in five states of the country.
While the ruling party alleged that the consummation of a fraudulent convocation had been prevented, the opposition accused Chavismo of using the courts to prevent the recall of Maduro , who appeared at a clear disadvantage in the polls.
Then there were the elections for the National Constituent Assembly (2017), a presidential election (2018) and an election to the National Assembly (2020), processes in which the majority of the opposition forces did not participate and which were not recognized by a large part of the international community.
After the legislative elections of 2020, the European Union issued a statement stating that it was not going to recognize the results, stating that this vote took place without a national agreement on electoral conditions , without respecting the minimum international criteria of a credible process and without a mobilization of the electorate.
Although the new CNE leadership was appointed this Tuesday by that same National Assembly elected in 2020, the appointments are the result of a negotiation process with sectors of civil society and a part of the opposition, and include two figures with a profile contrary to the ruling party: Roberto Picón and Enrique Márquez.
Picón is an electoral expert who was an advisor to the opposition and now defunct Democratic Unity Table and who was imprisoned for a few months in 2017 accused by the government of treason, military rebellion and theft of military equipment.
Enrique Márquez was vice president of the majority National Assembly opponent elected in 2015 and is the former leader of Un Nuevo Tiempo, a party from which he was expelled in 2017 after having supported the presidential elections of that year despite the fact that the majority of the opposition considered that they did not There were conditions for free elections.
These appointments leave the ruling party with a majority of three rectors (Tania D’Amelio, Pedro Calzadilla and Alexi s Corridor), but they could open a gap to have an electoral body recognized by both the government and the opposition.
The task, however, will not be easy since it starts with the rejection of the opposition sectors that support the opposition leader Juan Guaidó , recognized as interim president of Venezuela by the United States and several dozen countries.
The Guaidó’s sector argues that the majority Chavista National Assembly, whose election it does not recognize, is not empowered to appoint a new CNE.
On Twitter, Guaidó considered that “the consequences of wanting to impose an arbitrator electoral process will be the same as in 2019 Y 2020: drag Venezuela into a major disaster. ”
The rectors of the CNE are chosen for a period of seven years and, according to With the electoral calendar, this year they would have the task of organizing elections regional and municipal regulations.
2. The pandemic table
Despite Guaidó’s reaction to the CNE’s appointments, the coronavirus pandemic seems to have opened a field of possible meeting between the Maduro government and the section of the opposition he leads.
Given the health emergency, last year a technical table was created with the participation of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in which, in addition to the Maduro government, other sectors of the country were represented, including the opposition .
As part of this process, a plan for the acquisition of covid vaccines was started – 19 through the international mechanism Covax (Global Access Fund for V covid cradles – 19), which would be paid for -at least partially- with frozen Venezuelan funds by the United States government and made available to Guaidó.
The 13 of April, when announcing the initial payment for the acquisition of a first batch of vaccines, the president of the ruling National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez , revealed that they had the use of those resources at Guaidó’s disposal to make the purchase.
“President Maduro canceled half of those US $ 119 millions that were needed for the mechanism. If more money is contributed from the sequestered resources, well, it will be the money to buy the vaccines that are needed through PAHO and WHO, ”said Rodríguez.
The government announced that had paid $ 64 million dollars as initial to purchase enough vaccines to attend the 20% of the population. It was then expected that the rest of the resources would come from the funds that would be unfrozen by the United States at the request of Guaidó.
However, a few days later, Maduro claimed that he had paid the remaining part of the bill.
The unexpected announcement caused surprise, but it does not appear to have ended the opposition’s involvement in financing vaccines, as few days later Guaidó approved the use of $ 100 million dollars of funds frozen in the United States for the acquisition of vaccines through Covax.
3. House arrest for former Citgo executives
Friday 30 In April, six former executives of Citgo , a PDVSA subsidiary in the United States, were released and placed under house arrest.
The former employees of the Venezuelan oil company -five of they with US citizenship and another with permanent residence permit in the US – they pay harsh sentences of up to 13 years in prison after being convicted of corruption, embezzlement and criminal association.
They claim to be innocent and consider themselves victims of an operation by the Maduro government to gain influence in Washington .
The exejec Untives were living and working in the United States when they were called to Caracas for an “emergency meeting” in November of 2017, where they were arrested.
In December 2019 , had been placed under house arrest, but were returned to prison in January 2019, the same day that then-President Donald Trump received Guaidó in the White House.
That they have been put back under house arrest is a gesture that is seen as a nod from the Maduro government to Joe Biden’s White House.
4. The unprecedented UN food aid
The signing in mid-April of an unprecedented agreement between the UN World Food Program (WFA) and the Maduro’s government to mitigate the food crisis that Venezuela is suffering is another of the signs that something seems to be moving in the South American country.
The general director of the WFA, David Beasley , traveled to Caracas where he signed the agreement that provides for feeding 185, 000 by the end of this year and gradually increasing until reaching 1.5 million students by the end of this year. anus 2023.
In December 2020, the Bloomberg agency reported that the negotiations to allow the entry of food aid into Venezuela They had lasted eight months and that since October there was a tentative agreement that failed to materialize because the Maduro government insisted on controlling the distribution of aid.
During his visit to Venezuela, Beasley expressly thanked Maduro for allowing them to “be independent” and not letting anyone politicize their work.
In another unusual gesture, the signing of this agreement was celebrated by both the Maduro government and Guaidó, with whom Beasley also met in Caracas.
5. Imputations in emblematic human rights cases
On May 1, Tarek William Saab , attorney general, gave a twist to the official narrative on two of the most notorious cases of human rights violations in recent years.
In the case of Juan Pablo Pernalete , a young man from 20 years passed away during the anti-government protests in April 2017, Saab stated that had died after being hit by a tear gas canister in the chest So what 12 officials of the Bolivarian National Guard had been charged with murder.
That information It directly contradicts the official position offered at the time by the then Minister of Communication and Information, Ernesto Villegas, who had described the version of the international press that attributed the death to the impact of a tear gas bomb as “lighthearted and light”.
Villegas affirmed, on the other hand, that there was a “police approach that shows with a high degree of veracity ” the possibility that the young man had died from the impact of a bolt pistol.
In the days following the death of Pernalete, the official would echo on his Twitter account videos and materials that pointed in the direction of the possibility that the The young man would have died at the hands of other opposition protesters.
The attorney general Saab also modified the official position regarding the death of the former councilor Fernando Albán, died in the custody of the Venezuelan authorities on October 8, 2017.
Albán was detained on the floor 10 of the Service headquarters building Bolivariano de Inteligencia (Sebin), when he fell through a window. The official version then offered by Saab himself was that the opponent had committed suicide.
However, last September, the report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of UN Venezuela expressed “strong reservations” about the possibility that Albán had committed suicide and said it had “reasonable grounds to believe that public officials were involved in his death.”
This Saturday, the Attorney General announced that two Sebin officials had been arrested and charged on various charges in the Albán case, including manslaughter.
What does it mean?
But, what reading can be given to these recent events?
“What there is is a clear interest on the part of the government d e Maduro to see if he can achieve some relaxation in US policy. They seek some kind of relief from the sanctions and the possibility of having a political future in a possible post-Chavista future ”, Geoff Ramsey , director for Venezuela of the Washington Office for Latin American Affairs (WOLA), a think tank based in the US capital).
He points out that the government of President Joe Biden does not conceive of sanctions as an end in themselves but as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of having “free and fair” elections for the presidency and for the National Assembly.
“If we see the formation of a credible CNE with important concessions in terms of electoral conditions, perhaps we could see a partial response from the United States with some kind of relief. to sanctions, but there will never be a total uprising without first presidential elections free and credible in Venezuela “, he affirms.
” The big problem here is that the concessions have to be attractive and credible for Washington because there are political incentives in Washington that favor inertia, “he adds.
This Monday, a White House official told the Reuters agency that Maduro was “sending signals” but that the Biden government will not ease the sanctions if there are no concrete steps towards free elections in Venezuela.
According to that agency, the comment seemed respond to speculation about the possibility that the White House would lower the pressure on Maduro in response to gestures such as the agreement with the World Food Program or the release of former Citgo executives.
Ramsey recognizes that the fact that it is precisely the opposition sector linked to Guaidó that is openly opposing the appointment of the CNE represents an important difficulty, but points out that what happens also depends of the other opposition parties and of the international community.
From his point of view, the other large opposition parties, such as the one led by the former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles , have a regional structure larger than Voluntad Popular (the party of Guaidó and his mentor, Leopoldo López), so they are more likely to participate in regional elections at the end of the year. “They understand the value of not losing that relevance in the interior of the country,” he points out.
He explains that the attitude of rejection of the new CNE and the call for regional elections this year -without having previously presidential and legislative elections – will also depend on the reading made by the international community, whose support gives legitimacy and support to the opposition.
“If the opposition decides to seek a solution that is not a political agreement agreed with international support, it will lose a lot of momentum,” he says.
Although, of course, before the opposition faces this dilemma, it will be necessary for the Venezuelan government to be willing to offer significant concessions in terms of electoral conditions and guarantees that comply with international standards. Something that the majority of the opposition and the international community consider has not happened since 2015.
Now you can receive notifications from BBC Mundo. Download the new version of our app and activate them so as not to miss our best content.